The Know Nothings Nobody Knows: Political Nativists in Antebellum Iowa ROBERT R. DYKSTRA THE KNOW NOTHING MOVEMENT emerged in the 1850s. It had as its goal the preservation of American democracy from the rising political influence of recent immigrants and Roman Catholics-especially immigrant Irish Catholics. Know Nothings were pledged to keep their activities secret; according to legend they were expected to disavow their affiliation to outsiders-as in, "I know nothing about it." By 1853 they had come to be called "Know Nothings," a label they themselves embraced as nicely reflecting the mystery surrounding their activities. Later, when they felt strong enough to openly form their own national political organization, the American party, they came to prefer being called "the Americans."Ĥ istorians of antebellum politics in the United States have become increasingly interested in the Know Nothings because of their apparent role in the breakup of the Whig party in the 1850s and the rise of the Republican party. But all of this new interest has virtually overlooked Know An earlier version of this article was presented at the Congress of Historical Organizations in Des Moines on June 16, 1993. I wish to thank Marvin Bergman, Ronald F. Matthias, and Lowell J. Soike for graciously furnishing me materials employed in revising the original. Nothing activity in the Hawkeye state.^ That is understandable: Iowa's historians have published almost nothing on its Know Nothing movement,^ There is no book on the Iowa Know Nothings, although two unpublished fulllength works exist.^ All that is to be found in the state his-torical journals are a few scattered memoirs of local activity that are far too brief to be of much substantive use.^ A meticulous survey of nineteenth-century county histories might unearth similar snippets, but they would hardly add up to a coherent treatment.^ Although Hawkeyes were evidently very active in the movement, they remain the Know Nothings nobody knows.
This essay seeks to kindle scholarly interest in Iowa's Know Nothings. It does so by providing an up-to-date historiographical context for the Iowa movement, by constructing a summary narrative of what is known of the movement's brief career and of those involved as its leaders, and by offering a new assessment of grass-roots American party voters in Iowa, their political and social origins, and their numerical strength.
Know Nothing lodge was ever established in the Hawkeye slate. But the second unpublished study, Ronald F. Matthias Unfortunately, the text of the first citation is garbled. Line 50 of p. 151-'It was'-ends abruptly but is continued on line 39 of p. 152: "during the first year of the Know Nothing excitement which ran like wild fire all over our country." On line 29 of p. 153 the text-"Nearly ail the Democrats"-reverts back to line 50 of p. 151: "together with a great body of the Whigs voted the Know Nothing ticket." THE SUMMER OF 1854 was an exciting moment in the Hawkeye state. By electing Burlington's James W. Grimes as their governor, voters would overthrow a reactionary Democratic political machine that had ruled Iowa since its earliest existence as a territory. Representing an intricate fusion of the state's Free Soil party and its Whig party, the Grimes coalition was known as an "Anti-Nebraska" ticket because of its opposition to the Kansas-Nebraska Act permitting the spread of slavery into the trans-Missouri West. In the August 7 election the Anti-Nebraskans carried not only the governorship but also one of Iowa's two congressional seats, the state auditor's office, and a majority of the seats in the General Assembly. That legislature then held a controversial election (as was the practice in those days before the direct election of senators) and named an Anti-Nebraskan, James Harlan, to the U.S. Senate. It was a stunning triumph in the northern states' eight-year fight against slavery extension.Î n hindsight, the signs in Iowa as elsewhere pointed toward the reorganization of such antiextension state parties into a national Republican party committed to stemming the spread of slavery. Governor-elect Grimes was only one of many northern political leaders with that goal in mind. But throughout the North others entertained an alternate vision. They would co-opt all of this antiextension energy for Know Nothingism-that is, they hoped to create a movement that, while primarily nativist, would also be antislavery, curbing both slavery extension and the political influence of immigrants and Catholics. party of fur trappers. The Thorington family moved to Davenport in 1839, where James became a modestly prosperous lawyer and public official, serving multiple terms as mayor, probate judge, sheriff, recorder, and clerk of the district court. In 1854 he was elected to a single term in Congress. 'He was not a man of extraordinary ability," it was recalled of Congressman Thorington, 'but was a good politician and wirepuller." His most elaborate biography says nothing of his Know Nothing activities."
The chance for the antislavery coalition to consolidate its political success in a manner that would allow him to capture the leadership of the coalition from the new governor. In any case, five weeks after Grimes's election, Clarke was already at work devising a statewide Know Nothing organization.'Ê xcept for Thorington and Clarke, Iowa's Know Nothings were not prominent in Hawkeye politics. Few revealed their membership in the order at the moment it flourished, and few chose to admit it afterward. For example, we know that William H. Tuthill of Tipton was president of Iowa's Know Nothing Council only because he was listed as such on a charter issued to a lodge in Davis County and because an exchange between Thorington and Clarke implicitly confirms it.^^T uthill, descended from the earliest settlers of Long Island, had been born in New York City. After receiving a private-school education, he studied the engraver's trade until ill health forced him to give it up. During the 1832 cholera epidemic he served as assistant secretary of the New York Board of Health, a position apparently giving him claim to the title "Dr." that appears in one capsule biography. Thereafter he clerked in New York's prestigious Chemical Bank. In 1840, at age thirty-one, he moved to Iowa, possibly for his health, which was delicate throughout his life. In frontier Tipton he first ran a store, then was admitted to the bar, became active in Whig politics, dabbled briefly in journalism and various commercial enterprises, and served two lackluster terms on the district bench. 'Tuthill was not a success as a judge," recalled a contemporary, "and while civil business increased rapidly he was unable to dispose of it." Perhaps the reason was that he had already resumed his true calling as a banker. Other than Tuthill's having been nurtured in the often xenophobic politics of New York City and his evident pride in his Anglo-Saxon Protestant genealogy, there is no explanation for his leadership of the Iowa order. And although he once published a short comic piece on the subject, his biographies studiously overlook his Know Nothing allegiance.'Ê ariy in 1855 Tuthill won a special election for judge of the Eighth Judicial District in east-central Iowa. In that year the nation's Know Nothings-following New York State's example-began to field their own slates of candidates for political office. Besides Tuthill, Iowa Know Nothing candidates (in most cases suitably disguised as "independent" or "people's" nominees) won victories that spring in municipal elections in Council Bluffs, Farmington, Keosauqua, Le Claire, Washington, West Point, and-more importantly, because of their size-Davenport, Iowa City, Keokuk, and Muscatine. Know Nothings lost Burlington only because election judges permitted the votes of 150 to 400 unnaturalized aliens to be cast against them. They carried township elections in Burling- allegiances. Since all ten counties, says Ronald Matthias, *had, at one time or another, strong Know Nothing organizations,' it is plausible that nativists in these locales could boast responsibility for the fusion ticket's popularity. Leading Democrats agreed. "Politically/ complained a Keokuk Jacksonian, *we are beaten in all this region by the accursed, secret, oath bound gang, of 'Know Nothings' .. . the d st, & most atrocious, of all the organized isms we have yet had to contend against."'' IOWA'S KNOW NOTHINGS, like their counterparts elsewhere, might agree when it came to immigrants. Catholics, and perhaps liquor prohibition, but they varied in the strength of their antislavery impulses. Thus a Burlington newspaper editor explained that he joined the order as a means of intellectually escaping the slavery issue. In 1854, he wrote, "the whole political world being at loose ends, when whigs were whigs no longer, when democrats were holding the knife to each others throats over the Nebraska bill, and when rumor whispered that there was a great national conservative party growing up, composed of the better men and sounder patriotism of both the old parties, I submitted to an initiation." (Such escapism, as Matthias suggests, may well have motivated the heavily southern-born Know Nothings of the Missouri-border counties fearful of a sectional civil war. And perhaps it is no coincidence that both William Penn Clarke and James Thorington had been born and raised in slave states.) But Tipton's Know Nothing editor. Wells Spicer, explained the ultimate political position of men like himself, Clarke, and Thorington. "Upon the slavery question we ... are Anti-Nebraska," he said, "first, last and all the time-are opposed to the extension of slavery-opposed to its existence." As an Oskaloosa Know Nothing asserted, "I am an American, and expect to stick to that party & its principles. Could Iowans of such widely differing shades of opinion be kept together in a single political movement? Not likely, given the drumbeat for repeal of the Kansas-Nebraska Act that grew more intense around the nation as 1855 wore on. Anti-Nebraskans everywhere, including Iowa's Governor Grimes, prepared to co-opt the Know Nothings into a new Republican party. Events played into their hands.
As early as the end of May 1855, Iowa's Know Nothing press seemed to be less alarmed about the pope's designs on America than about proslavery settlers' activities in Kansas. When the national Know Nothing convention in Philadelphia drafted what could be considered a proslavery platform, Clarke was dismayed but continued to work within the order for another eight months. But most Hawkeyes-including a great many Iowa Know Nothings-thereafter looked to the fledgling Republican party movement, not to the slaverytainted Know Nothings, for redress. As Know Nothing membership in Iowa fell off, local Republican conventions began to flourish, and the American party lost ground in the August 1855 elections. After that the Know Nothing press swung into line behind Republicanism. Iowa's American party convened to pass seven resolutions, only one of which reflected standard nativist concerns. The others expressed hostility to slavery. The state's Know Nothings, in effect, had offered the antiextensionists another fusion-if uneasily. "They are timid," cautioned Wells Spicer, who now considered himself a Republican, "-they have a misgiving about becoming a part and parcel of us in the coming campaign.'^^ Obviously, the Know Nothings would exact a price for their cooperation.
About Nothings, on hand to help superintend a coalition. The main problem faced by the Republican delegates was how to coalesce with the American party without alienating Iowa's German-born voters, who were already upset about the new party's possible endorsement of liquor prohibition. The evidence for the fusion is not in the Republican platform, which said nothing about nativism, but in the four candidate nominations. In his highly regarded recent book on the origins of the nation's Republican party, William E. Gienapp concludes that friction over the Iowa nominations was nonexistent because "all officers to be elected in [August] were of limited importance." But the real reason there was no friction is that the Republican nominations were, by design, political payoffs to the Know Nothings. The convention's refusal to name William Penn Clarke for attorney general was the only hitch. It nominated reputed or admitted Know Nothings Elijah Sells for secretary of state, Martin L. Morris for state treasurer, and John Pattee for state auditor. A week later, the American party's state convention named the same men, and fusion was complete. ^B ut then it all came to naught. "The course that the Republican press is now taking will in my opinion destroy all hope of union," wrote one concerned observer. 'The state ticket nominated by both parties they denominate the 'Republican' ticket, instead of claiming as the fact is, that it is a 'union' or 'peoples' ticket.... If the Republicans consider it a union ticket they ought to say so, if not they can't expect the American party as a party to vote it." In the end, neither the national Know Nothings nor the Iowa Know Nothings permitted themselves to be co-opted for free soil.^Ŵ hen the American party's national convention refused to condemn the Kansas-Nebraska Act and gave its presidential nomination to ex-President Millard Fillmore, widely detested in the North for having enthusiastically signed the But the Know Nothings were not quite out for the count. In August 1856 yet another native southerner, the Alabamaborn physician John J. Selman of Bloomfield, ran for Congress on the Know Nothing ticket. He came in a very poor third with a mere 828 votes. In only nine of his district's thirty-six southern counties did anyone at all vote for Dr. Selman. Not surprisingly, he did his best-one-fifth of the ballots cast-in his own Davis County (table 1) . That was the only multicounty election witnessing a direct face-off among Republican, Democratic, and Know Nothing nominees. Unfortunately, the meager and very unevenly distributed third-party vote precludes any plausible statistical analysis of it.25 In the presidential election of November 1856, Iowa went for the Republican candidate, John C. Fremont, although the Democrat, James Buchanan, won the election nationwide. Fillmore, with a paltry 9,679 votes (10 percent of the total cast) came in a poor third. He won not a single county, although along the Missouri border he did quite well. [Buchanan] ." This statement reflects Fillmore's relative popularity along the Missouri border. It also suggests his appeal, as a former Whig, to Iowa's 'old line" Whigs: an estimated 29 percent of the men who 28. Matthias, "Know Nothing Movement," 201. In setting up the analyses, I deemed it unnecessary to compute the "inéligibles' of August Í856 because the August and November elections were chronologically so close as to make the two electorates very similar in size. Also, no other aspect of the August election suggested the need for any additional measure of statistical precision. (For a discussion of the normal requirement for such calculations, see Dykstra, Bright Radical Star, 284.) Similarly, 1 let November's estimate of eligible voters serve as a surrogate for the estimated eligible voters of August. Despite the end of organized nativism, the Iowa Republicans' challenge through the late 1850s was to continue extending a quiet welcome to ex-Know Nothings while remaining openly congenial to the German-born. As U.S. Senator James Harlan put it, "We must keep Iowa in line. This will require wise counsels and discreet action. We have a large American vote in the southern counties, and a large foreign element in all the counties bordering on the Mississippi river. We cannot afford to lose either." The former task was far easier than the latter. With respect to Iowa, at least, one cannot convincingly deny William Gienapp's conclusion that switching allegiance from the American to the Republican party required little deep soul-searching. Iowa's German Republicans, on the other hand, remained uneasy, always ready to bolt when they suspected that the party's anti-liquor wing was gaining ascendancy.^3 an end.^^ Maybe this political fallout was the most lasting effect of Iowa's short-lived, unlamented Know Nothingism of the 1850s.
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